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1193 
UNITED STATES v. TEXAS AND SUPREME COURT 
IMMIGRATION JURISPRUDENCE: A DELINEATION OF 
ACCEPTABLE IMMIGRATION POLICY UNILATERALLY 
CREATED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
DANIEL R. SCHUTRUM-BOWARD 
The United States has become increasingly dependent1 on immi-
grants.2  Immigrants aid in providing U.S. citizens with a myriad of ser-
vices, making possible crucial aspects of our lives.3  However, many of 
these hardworking individuals remain undocumented4 and, therefore, live 
with the constant possibility of being detained by immigration authorities, 
thrown into deportation proceedings5 and, consequently, separated from 
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 1.  See, e.g., Tamar Jacoby, Without Immigrant Labor, the Economy Would Crumble, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/17/could-farms-survive-
without-illegal-labor/without-immigrant-labor-the-economy-would-crumble (“Immigrant workers 
aren’t a ‘cheap labor’ alternative . . . .  They are the only labor available to do many unskilled 
jobs, and if they were eliminated, most would not be replaced.  Instead, whole sectors of the econ-
omy would shrivel, and with them, many other jobs often filled by more skilled Americans.”).  
 2.  This Comment will use the terms “immigrants” and “aliens.”  The latter is a legal term.  
See generally Lauren Gambino, “No Human Being Is Illegal”: Linguists Argue Against Mislabel-
ing of Immigrants, GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/06/illegal-immigrant-label-offensive-wrong-activists-say (discussing the labeling 
of immigrants).  
 3. CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN WORKER: A 
REVIEW OF THE ACADEMIC AMERICAN LITERATURE 19 (2013), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/ 
borjas-economics.pdf (explaining that immigrants benefit those born in the United States in many 
ways because they “buy goods and services produced by American firms, increasing the demand 
for native workers; they can lower the price of services in many industries, such as construction, 
benefiting American consumers; and immigrant entrepreneurs open up firms, create jobs, and pos-
sibly make a large contribution to economic growth”). 
 4.  Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts about Illegal Immigration in the U.S, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/03/5-facts-about-illegal-
immigration-in-the-u-s/ (“There were 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in 2014, a 
total unchanged from 2009 and accounting for 3.5% of the nation’s population.  The number of 
unauthorized immigrants peaked in 2007 at 12.2 million, when this group was 4% of the U.S. 
population.”). 
 5.  See generally Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceed-
ings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing the deportation process under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act and the possibility of erroneous orders of deportation). 
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family,6 severed from economic stability, and repatriated to a potentially 
dangerous country.7  To prevent this devastating outcome, in 2012, the De-
partment of Homeland Security effectuated by executive order Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).8  DACA is a policy wherein the 
government agrees to defer prosecution of certain undocumented children 
and young adults “for a period of two years, subject to renewal, in order to 
prevent low priority individuals from being removed from the United 
States.”9  The Executive Branch then issued a memorandum in 2014, which 
sought to expand eligibility for the DACA program to a larger pool of indi-
viduals by creating Deferred Action for Parents of Americans program 
(“DAPA”).10  Under DAPA, individuals eligible for the program would be 
permitted to stay in the United States with their children.11  Twenty-five 
states brought suit to enjoin the programs, and the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction.12  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in November 
2015,13 relying on a Gordian knot of nebulous immigration and administra-
tive jurisprudence.14  The Supreme Court of the United States, by an equally 
divided Court, affirmed the injunction.15 
Part I of this Comment gives a brief description of the legal landscape 
of Supreme Court immigration cases,16 which recognize that Congress has 
                                                          
 6.  See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (noting the detrimental impact of 
deportation on families). 
 7.  See, e.g., Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, U.S. Government Deporting Central 
American Migrants to Their Deaths, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-central-america (“The U.S. government is 
deporting undocumented immigrants back to Central America to face imminent threat of vio-
lence . . . .”).  
 8.  See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. 
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. et al. (June 15, 2012), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_ memo_deferred_action.pdf (listing 
specific criteria that applicants must meet in order to receive deferred action); see infra Part I.C. 
 9.  Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 8, at 2. 
 10.  The Department of Homeland Security’s Authorization to Prioritize Removal of Certain 
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 
6 (2014) [hereinafter DAPA Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/att 
achments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf.  
 11.  See, e.g., MIGRATION IN AN ERA OF RESTRICTION AND RECESSION: SENDING AND 
RECEIVING NATIONS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 93–94 (David L. Leal & Nestor P. 
Rodríguez eds., 2016) (discussing the DAPA and DACA programs’ goal of protecting “well-
defined groups of unauthorized immigrants from deportation”). 
 12.  Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
 13.  The memorandum issued in 2014 and the collective DAPA and DACA expansion pro-
grams it temporarily implemented, are hereinafter referred to as the “2014 memo” and the “2014 
memo programs,” respectively. 
 14.  Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 15.  United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). 
 16.  See infra Part I.A. 
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plenary power over immigration,17 and the Executive Branch’s authority to 
execute immigration law18 and promulgate administrative rules relating to 
immigration policy.19  Part II discusses the way in which the Court’s opin-
ions implicitly demonstrate that Congress’s plenary power is inextricably 
tied to both the Executive Branch’s wisdom of “nation well-being” and de-
terminations of pressing social concerns surrounding immigration,20 a tie 
the Obama Administration thoroughly investigated and understood when 
implementing the 2014 memo programs.21  Part II, moreover, argues that 
the Court should not have affirmed the preliminary injunction against the 
2014 memo programs because the plaintiff states did not prove a cognizable 
injury,22 and the preliminary injunction likely harms the residents of the 
plaintiff states more than the 2014 memo programs would harm the states.23 
I.  JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN IMMIGRATION: THE COURT’S ENTRUSTMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION POLICY TO THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 
This Part discusses pinnacle Supreme Court immigration cases where-
in the Court has delineated the federal political branches’ authority to form 
and execute immigration law24 and Congress’s plenary power25 to enact 
immigration law.26  Subsequently, this Part illustrates the Executive 
Branch’s long-standing authority to exercise discretion in determining when 
to enforce immigration law.27  Finally, this Part explains the common ways 
in which the Executive Branch, over several administrations, has supple-
mented immigration policy.28 
                                                          
 17.  See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 
374 (2004) (“The constitutional core of immigration law—the doctrine of Congress’s plenary 
power over immigration— . . . largely insulates federal immigration law from constitutional at-
tack.”).  But see Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?: A Tentative Apology and 
Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 257, 259 (2000).  (“The plenary power cases use strong language in support of the idea that 
Congress can do what it wants, but they may be largely dicta.”). 
 18.  See infra Part I.B. 
 19.  See infra Part I.C. 
 20.  See infra Part II.A. 
 21.  See infra Part II.B. 
 22.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 23.  See infra Part II.C. 
 24.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (declaring that the President of the U.S. “shall take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (stat-
ing that “[t]he Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by 
Congress; the President, it says, ‘shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ personally 
and through officers whom he appoints” (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)). 
 25.  Cox, supra note 17, at 4. 
 26.  See infra Part I.A. 
 27.  See infra Part I.B. 
 28.  See infra Part I.C. 
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A.  The Political Branches Have Power Over Immigration Policy 
The Supreme Court has consistently, with some restrained deviations, 
held that enactment and enforcement of immigration law are only within the 
purview of the federal political branches, often concluding that Congress 
derives a somewhat elusive yet plenary power over the arena through Arti-
cle I of the Constitution.29  The justifications for the allocation of power 
over immigration law to the political branches, and the consequent non-
reviewability (or limited reviewability)30 of these laws by the federal courts 
largely are based on the federal political branches’ knowledge of and duty 
to ensure national well-being, which preserves national sovereignty.31  Le-
gal considerations implicating national well-being, like national sovereign-
ty, foreign affairs, and national security, are the common thread tying to-
gether most of the key decisions by the Court to leave immigration policy to 
the political branches.32 
The earliest indication of this allocation of power in the political 
branches can be found in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,33 also called 
The Chinese Exclusion Case, of 1889.  The appellant in this case was a 
Chinese citizen who had been denied reentry into the United States due to 
an 1888 congressional enactment (which contravened an existing treaty be-
tween the United States and China).34  The Court, on the one hand, upheld 
the exclusion,35 giving deference to the authority and insight of the political 
branches by claiming, “[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an inci-
dent of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a 
                                                          
 29.  See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (stating that immigration 
“matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely im-
mune from judicial inquiry or interference”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (declaring that “Con-
gress shall have [p]ower [t]o . . . establish an uniform [r]ule of [n]aturalization . . . [a]nd [t]o make 
all [l]aws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into [e]xecution the foregoing 
[p]owers”).  But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (mentioning that the “[plenary] 
power is subject to important constitutional limitations”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 
(1983) (noting that the Legislative Branch must elect “a constitutionally permissible means of im-
plementing [its plenary] power”); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 37 (1982) (holding that a 
lawful permanent resident facing exclusion is entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (consid-
ering due process concerns over immigration law). 
 30.  Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589. 
 31.  See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (emphasizing the federal 
government’s duty to preserve the national sovereignty of the United States). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 34.  Id. at 600 (conceding that “the act of 1888 is in contravention of express stipulations of 
the treaty of 1868 and of the supplemental treaty of 1880, but it is not on that account invalid or to 
be restricted in its enforcement”). 
 35.  Id. at 603 (noting that “the government of the United States, through the action of the 
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think 
open to controversy”). 
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part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution . . . .”36  The 
Court, on the other hand, signaled specifically that the Executive Branch 
has authority over this area of law, referring to “[t]he act [of 1888] vested in 
the President power to order [deported] all such aliens as he should judge 
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States . . . .”37  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court correspondingly articulated its institutional in-
competence to intervene,38 which set the scene for numerous Supreme 
Court immigration cases wherein the Court deferred to the political branch-
es.39 
The twentieth century did not result in any significant doctrinal shift 
away from recognizing the authority of the political branches over immigra-
tion law.  In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,40 the Court held 
that Ms. Knauff, the noncitizen wife of a U.S. citizen, was rightly found ex-
cludable by the Attorney General.41  The Court based this decision in part 
on classified information, stating that “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a funda-
mental act of sovereignty.  The right to do so stems not alone from legisla-
tive power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign af-
fairs of the nation.”42  The Court, in this instance, indicated that both 
political branches share authority over immigration policy; however, by re-
ferring to the Executive Branch’s authority as “inherent,” the Court, here, 
may have been interpreting the Constitution as vesting a greater authority in 
                                                          
 36.  Id. at 609.  With respect to the authority of the government in this area of law, the Court 
explained: 
The power of exclusion of foreigners . . . , as a part of those sovereign powers delegated 
by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the 
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained 
on behalf of any one. 
Id. 
 37.  Id. at 610. 
 38.  Id. at 602–03 (“[W]hether our government [may] disregard[] its engagements with anoth-
er nation is not one for the determination of the courts. . . . This court is not a censor of the morals 
of other branches of government; it is not invested with any authority to pass judgment upon the 
motives of their conduct.”).  
 39.  Four years after The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court once again enshrined the ultimate 
authority of the political branches over immigration law.  In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 
U.S. 651 (1892), the Court upheld the exclusion of a Chinese national based on the determination 
of an immigration officer (an agent of the Executive Branch) that Ms. Ekiu was nearly insolvent 
and, hence, would impose a financial burden on the public.  Id. at 662.  The Court noted: “It is an 
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power . . . to forbid the 
entrance of foreigners . . . .”  Id. at 659.  Further, the Court reiterated that it is the dominion of the 
political branches to preserve the country’s wellbeing and sovereignty.  Id. at 659 (stating that the 
political branches have the authority “to admit [foreigners] only . . . upon such conditions as it 
may see fit to prescribe”); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713–14 (1893) 
(holding that Congress has the authority “to expel [noncitizens], like the power to exclude [noncit-
izens] . . . from the country, [which] may be exercised entirely through executive officers”). 
 40.  338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 41.  Id. at 537. 
 42.  Id. at 542. 
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the Executive Branch, as opposed to the Legislative Branch, from which 
such policy “stems.”43  Though the Court has never delineated the alloca-
tion of power between the political branches exactly, it has, nonetheless, 
has not meaningfully veered from the conclusion that immigration policy is 
exclusively within the province of the political branches.44 
B.  The Executive Branch’s Power to Use Enforcement Discretion 
While there remains residual confusion over the roles that each politi-
cal branch plays in the formulation of immigration policy,45 it is uncontest-
ed that the Executive Branch has the power to decide how immigration laws 
are to be enforced.46  Article II of the U.S. Constitution gives the Executive 
Branch the authority to execute laws created by Congress through Con-
gress’s plenary lawmaking power rooted in Article I of the Constitution.47  
The Executive Branch, however, is not bound to enforce all laws created by 
Congress without considering the most effective way to do so.48  Indeed, 
enforcement discretion is an essential tool that the Executive Branch em-
ploys within the administrative state and the federal criminal justice system, 
which allows it to decide how best—and when—to enforce the law.49  
While the concept of enforcement discretion may seemingly contradict the 
Executive Branch’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully execut-
                                                          
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (reaffirming its prior 
holdings on the matter in stating “[t]hat aliens remain[ing] vulnerable to expulsion after long resi-
dence is . . . a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent 
in every sovereign state.  Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien and we leave 
the law on the subject as we find it.”); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (“For 
reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the 
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal 
Government. . . . [S]uch decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Leg-
islature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.” (emphasis added)); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 
530 (1954) (determining that a noncitizen could be removed due to past membership in the Com-
munist Party without violating his or her right to due process, because of the political branches’ 
broad power over immigration grounded in their duty to preserve national security and foreign 
relations). 
 45.  See supra Part I.A. 
 46.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (mandating that the Executive Branch “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed”). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (explaining the importance of 
exercising enforcement discretion on unauthorized workers as it “embraces immediate human 
concerns” and spares government resources that are better spent on deporting “alien smugglers or 
aliens who commit a serious crime”). 
 49.  See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (recognizing that “an [executive] 
agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision 
of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as 
the special province of the Executive Branch”). 
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ed,” the duty is not without bounds.50  The history of enforcement discretion 
indicates that the Executive Branch may decide not to enforce the law “on a 
case-by-case basis,” but is disallowed from doing so wholesale.51  The Ex-
ecutive Branch, as further elucidated below, has employed enforcement dis-
cretion on several occasions within the realm of immigration.52 
C.  Supplementation of Immigration Legislation by the Executive 
Branch 
The primary statutory source of immigration law is the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”),53 which has been amended on several occa-
sions since its creation.54  Such acts of Congress, on many past occasions, 
however, have been supplemented by the Executive Branch when the text 
of the statute is lacking in detail or cannot be implemented by the agency 
without promulgating administrative rules.55  The agencies within the Exec-
utive Branch may supplement existing legislation through rulemaking pro-
cesses pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).56  The most 
common form of rulemaking is known as informal rulemaking, or notice-
and-comment rulemaking, in which a federal agency publishes notice of the 
proposed rule in the Federal Registrar and then responds to material com-
ments it receives from the public.57  Alternatively, the APA permits execu-
tive agencies to pass interpretive rules, which merely interpret legislation, 
via executive memoranda in order to inform its officers of the appropriate 
                                                          
 50.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 (“Congress may limit an agency’s ex-
ercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise 
circumscribing an agency’s power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”). 
 51.  See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 n.8 (1999) 
(indicating that determinations of the enforcement of immigration law may be tailored to individ-
ual circumstances). 
 52.  See infra Part I.C.  
 53.  Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012)) [hereinafter INA]. 
 54.  The INA has been amended by legislation such as the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, and the Real ID Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231. 
 55.  The executive order is the mechanism through which the Executive Branch can create 
law.  See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding executive orders by 
President Reagan regarding relations with Iran to halt harmful legislation, deferring to the Execu-
tive Branch’s authority over national security and foreign affairs). 
 56.  5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (2012) (originally enacted 
as Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)). 
 57.  Id. § 553(b) (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal 
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have 
actual notice thereof in accordance with law.”). 
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way to execute the law.58  Interpretive rules, commonly effectuated by ex-
ecutive memorandum, are exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking.59 
In 1987, for example, President Ronald Reagan created the Family 
Fairness program—without first engaging in notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing—by executive memorandum.60  In effect, under the guise of “voluntary 
departure,” the program granted deferred action to undocumented spouses 
and children of documented immigrants, thereby allowing the lawfully pre-
sent family member sufficient time to be able to petition on behalf of her 
undocumented family.61 
This program was renewed by President George H.W. Bush in 1990.62  
The Bush Administration decided to extend the program via executive 
memorandum because, without it, immigration officials would be legally 
required to deport many undocumented immigrants who otherwise would 
have been eligible for lawful status due to their family members’ recent 
grant of lawful status.63  This memorandum went on to express that the pro-
gram intended “to assure uniformity in the granting of voluntary departure 
and work authorization for the ineligible [undocumented] spouses and chil-
dren of legalized aliens.”64  At the time, the application of the statutory 
scheme, in effect, had a disproportionate impact on undocumented immi-
grants (with respect to the guiding principle of family unity, in particular), 
because it resulted in the deportation of individuals who would have other-
wise been able to gain lawful status in the United States had they and their 
documented family members been given more time to complete the expen-
sive, laborious legalization process.65  To be eligible for the Family Fairness 
program, one must have been “admissible as an immigrant” except for un-
lawful presence, “not have been convicted of a felony or three misdemean-
ors” in the United States, and not have assisted in the persecution of any 
person.66  The Family Fairness program also listed three grounds on which 
                                                          
 58.  Id. § 552(a)(1)(d).  
 59.  Id. § 553(b)(3)(A) (stating that “[e]xcept when notice or hearing is required by statute, 
this subsection does not apply . . . to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice”). 
 60.  Memorandum from Gene McNary, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., to 
Reg’l Comm’rs (Feb. 2, 1990), reprinted in 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 164, 165 (1990).  This 
memorandum states that the “family fairness” program serves as “guidelines,” therefore, it would 
not need to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id. (stating that “[v]oluntary departure will be granted for a one-year period”). 
 63.  Id. (noting that the former INS was “likely to face the issue of family fairness for several 
more years, because of the length of time needed for newly legalized aliens to acquire lawful per-
manent resident status and then to wait for a visa preference number to become available for fami-
ly members”). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 164–65. 
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the Executive Branch could not extend voluntary departure and two items 
of documentary evidence to be submitted.67 
The Obama Administration, as previously mentioned, proposed pro-
grams similar to the Family Fairness Program in 2012 and 201468; however, 
it decided to include more detail and explanation of its legal basis for its ex-
ecutive action.69  In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
created DACA, allowing undocumented individuals who entered the United 
States without authorization and met enumerated qualifications to gain law-
ful presence.70  In 2014, DHS issued an executive memorandum that ex-
panded the timeframe of DACA and directed DHS officials to implement 
the DAPA and Lawful Permanent Residents program.71  The DAPA pro-
gram would have granted lawful presence to targeted individuals and some 
public benefits, such as eligibility for work authorization and driver’s li-
censes.72 
The 2014 memo programs, echoing their predecessor, the Family Fair-
ness program, stressed the need for sensible application of U.S. immigration 
laws by prioritizing the deportation of individuals who pose a threat to the 
country—as opposed to a potentially haphazard, priority-blind applica-
tion—thereby pragmatically and expeditiously spending government re-
sources.73  The 2014 memo, furthermore, explained that “[d]eferred action 
is a long-standing administrative mechanism,” allowing the Secretary of 
DHS to defer the deportation of undocumented immigrants for a fixed peri-
od of time and cited the Family Fairness program of the Reagan and Bush 
Senior Administrations for support.74  In line with the Family Fairness pro-
gram, the 2014 memo programs were intended to add administrative con-
venience, “promote the humane enforcement of the law[,] and ensure family 
unity.”75   
                                                          
 67.  Id. at 165. 
 68.  See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
 69.  Much of the Executive Branch’s explanation of and legal authority for the granting of 
deferred action (particularly DACA) can be found in an opinion released by the Executive 
Branch’s Office of Legal Counsel.  See DAPA Memo, supra note 10 (explaining the legality of 
DAPA on the grounds that “agency’s enforcement decisions [are] consonant with, rather than con-
trary to, the congressional policy underlying the statutes the agency is charged with administer-
ing”). 
 70.  See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez, 
Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs. et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf (reiterating the functionali-
ty of DACA from the original 2012 memo). 
 71.  Id. at 3. 
 72.  Id. at 3–4. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 2. 
 75.  Id.  
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 The 2014 memo further explained that deferred action was a method 
through which the Secretary of DHS could defer the deportation of undoc-
umented immigrants on various grounds, including humanitarianism.76  
Beneficiaries of the 2014 memo programs would not receive any legal sta-
tus in the United States, “much less citizenship,” but rather mere permission 
to lawfully remain in the country for a predetermined period of time.77  Ac-
cording to the memo, such deferred action is legal so long as each applicant 
for the programs is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.78  Moreover, the 2014 
memo explained that deferred action was used historically to allow “minor 
children of certain legalized immigrants, widows of U.S. citizens, [and] vic-
tims of trafficking and domestic violence,” to lawfully remain in the United 
States.79  The first aforementioned example is illustrated by the DACA pro-
gram put in place in 2012, and its subsequent expansion by the 2014 
memo.80   
The rationale for the expansion of deferred action in the 2014 memo 
was that the majority of the individuals who would be eligible for the 2014 
memo programs were “hard-working people who ha[d] become integrated 
members of American society.”81  Such individuals, the 2014 memo further 
justified, were unlikely to “represent threats to national security, public 
safety, and border security,” and would be “encourage[d] . . . to come out of 
the shadows, submit to background checks, pay fees, apply for work author-
ization . . . , and be counted.”82 
The 2014 memo set out explicit requirements under which U.S. Cus-
toms and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) was to implement the DAPA 
program, which were to be comparable to DACA.83  In order to be eligible 
for DAPA one must: have a child who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent 
resident; have continuously resided in the United States since before Janu-
ary 1, 2010; be physically present in the United States on the date of the 
memorandum’s issuance and at the time of applying for a 2014 memo pro-
gram with USCIS; have no lawful status on the date of the memorandum; 
not be “an enforcement priority”; and demonstrate no other factors that 
make the grant of deferred action inappropriate.84  The 2014 memo pro-
                                                          
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id.  The implicit statutory authority for the granting of deferred action can be found in 
several federal statutes.  Id. at 3 n.2 (detailing several sections of the INA that permit deferred ac-
tion for self-petitioners under the Violence Against Women Act, as well as for victims of human 
trafficking and other qualifying crimes perpetrated in the United States).  
 79.  Id. at 2. 
 80.  Id. at 3. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 4. 
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grams were challenged with legal action shortly after their implementa-
tion.85 
D.  United States v. Texas: The Clash of the Administrative Procedures 
Act, States, and the Executive Branch 
In response to the 2014 memo, Texas and twenty-five other states filed 
for a preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas.86  The plaintiff states argued that the 2014 memo programs 
constituted a substantive change in immigration law and, therefore, needed 
to be promulgated by notice-and-comment rulemaking.87  Finding in favor 
of the plaintiffs, the district court determined the 2014 memo programs 
gave “lawful presence” to their recipients, which DHS did not have statuto-
ry authority to do, and was not an interpretive rule exempt from notice-and-
comment rulemaking.88  Additionally, the court found that the memo pro-
grams conferred practical benefits on the recipients, including work author-
ization and state-subsidized driver’s licenses, which resulted in economic 
injury to the states that gave rise to Article III standing.89  Consequently, the 
district court granted the preliminary injunction.90 
The U.S. government then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the states lacked standing to bring the claim, 
principally due to the absence of an Article III injury.91  The court, never-
theless, found that the 2014 memo would have required Texas to provide 
the program recipients with driver’s licenses, which would constitute a le-
gitimate economic injury, satisfying the injury requirement of Article III.92  
The court explained: “Deferred action . . . would affirmatively confer ‘law-
ful presence’ and associated benefits [including driver’s licenses and work 
authorization] on a class of unlawfully present aliens.”93 
The states again argued the 2014 memo programs violated the proce-
dural requirements of the APA and the programs should have been subject 
to notice-and-comment rulemaking.94  The court agreed, noting that the 
2014 memo programs would not, in fact, constitute a decision not to act (or 
                                                          
 85.  Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 86.  Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).   
 87.  Id. at 604.  The other plaintiff states on appeal include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebras-
ka, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Tennessee.  Id. at 604 n.1. 
 88.  Id. at 661. 
 89.  Id. at 611, 616–17, 670. 
 90.  Id. at 677. 
 91.  Texas, 809 F.3d 134. 
 92.  Id. at 152–53. 
 93.  Id. at 166. 
 94.  Id. at 149. 
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“deferred action”) by DHS, but rather a deliberate action to give undocu-
mented immigrants “lawful presence.”95  Moreover, the states, to the satis-
faction of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, showed that there was suffi-
cient evidence that DHS would not exercise case-by-case prosecutorial 
discretion in implementing the 2014 memo programs, but instead would 
categorically grant lawful status, thus violating administrative agencies’ du-
ties to exercise prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis.96  The court 
explained that “[a]lthough prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not ‘unfet-
tered.’  Declining to prosecute does not transform presence deemed unlaw-
ful by Congress into lawful presence and confer eligibility for otherwise 
unavailable benefits based on that change.”97 
The court consequently found that the preliminary injunction against 
the enactment of the 2014 memo programs was properly granted; he states 
had shown that they would likely succeed on the merits of their claim that 
the programs were required to undergo notice-and-comment, as the memo-
randum was a legislative rule and not merely a “policy statement,” or inter-
pretive rule.98  In extensive detail, the court additionally explained that the 
2014 memo programs contravened the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
laying out the extent to which DAPA would surpass the statutory authority 
granted to DHS by Congress under the INA; the court, for example, pointed 
out there was no explicit statutory authorization or historical practice that 
reveal’s DHS’s authority to implement DAPA.99  The court further found 
that the implementation of the 2014 memo programs within DHS would vi-
olate the APA because, in practice, the programs would not allow USCIS 
officers to exercise enforcement discretion as required by the APA, and that 
the government’s claim to the contrary was simply pretext.100  The officers 
were required to evaluate applications using a boilerplate form to determine 
whether to deny DACA applications, thereby stripping away any alleged 
discretion.101  Finally, the court concluded that Texas would suffer signifi-
cant costs by an increase in the issuance of partially state-subsidized driv-
er’s licenses to recipients of the 2014 memo programs.102  Therefore, the 
2014 memo programs would cause Texas a redressable injury giving Texas 
Article III standing to challenge the program.103  The government appealed 
                                                          
 95.  Id. at 168. 
 96.  Id. at 171–73. 
 97.  Id. at 167 (footnote omitted) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). 
 98.  Id. at 171–73. 
 99.  Id. at 185.  But see Nelson, supra note 60, at 1200–04 (detailing the Family Fairness pro-
gram, a practice similar to and preceding DAPA). 
 100.  Texas, 809 F.3d at 172. 
 101.  Id. at 174 (claiming that “there was evidence that the DACA application process itself did 
not allow for discretion, regardless of the rates of approval and denial”). 
 102.  Id. at 155. 
 103.  Id. at 163. 
 2017] UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 1205 
to the Supreme Court, and the Fifth Circuit ruling was summarily affirmed 
by an equally divided Court.104 
II.  ANALYSIS 
This Part first explains that Congress often depends on the Executive 
Branch in forming immigration policy, and the United States v. Texas 
courts should have given greater deference to the Executive Branch’s deci-
sion to implement the 2014 memo programs.105  Further, the Executive 
Branch has recognized, over several administrations, the pressing need for 
effectuating deferred action programs similar to the 2014 memo programs 
to shield certain undocumented immigrants from deportation.106  Therefore, 
the judiciary should have permitted to the implementation of the 2014 
memo programs.  In ruling to the contrary, the Court dodged crucial aspects 
of contemporary immigration jurisprudence by focusing on administrative 
minutia107 and phantom injuries.108 
A.  Immigration Legislation Is Often Informed—and Shaped—by the 
Executive Branch 
As seen in Part I, the Court has historically exercised judicial restraint 
when considering cases involving immigration law, frequently deferring to 
the political branches.109  Some legal scholars, however, have argued, “[t]he 
jurisprudential . . . focus on the distribution of power between courts and 
the political branches, though important, has obscured a second separation-
of-powers issue: the question of how immigration authority is distributed 
between the political branches themselves.”110  This Part argues that contra-
ry to the assertion that “[t]he Supreme Court has long glossed over separa-
tion-of-powers questions in immigration law,”111 the plenary power of Con-
gress to enact immigration law is tied to and informed by the Executive 
Branch’s knowledge of national independence and well-being.112  Conse-
quently, in certain instances, the Executive Branch’s findings and decisions 
inform immigration policy and its execution, justifying deference to the Ex-
ecutive Branch over matters of immigration law. 
                                                          
 104.  United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). 
 105.  See infra Part II.A. 
 106.  See infra Part II.B. 
 107.  See supra Part I.C. 
 108.  See infra Part II.C. 
 109.  See supra Part I. 
 110.  Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE 
L.J. 458, 460 (2009). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See supra Part I.A. 
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The Court, as an initial matter, certainly does not often distinguish be-
tween the roles played by the Legislative and Executive Branches.113  For 
example, in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Court stated, 
the “[a]dmission of aliens to the United States is a privilege granted by the 
sovereign United States Government, . . . only upon such terms as the Unit-
ed States shall prescribe.”114  The Court continued by emphasizing that the 
admission of noncitizens “must be exercised in accordance with the proce-
dure which the United States provides,” again not specifying which branch 
of government holds superior authority over the matter.115  Similarly, in Ha-
risiades v. Shaughnessy,116 the Court held that “any policy toward aliens 
is . . . so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to 
be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”117 Additionally, in 
Mathews v. Diaz et al.,118 the Court noted that “[f]or reasons long recog-
nized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the 
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political 
branches of the Federal Government.”119 
Despite the conflation of the two political branches’ authority over 
immigration law, the Court has often clarified that Congress’s authority 
over immigration policy to a certain degree relies on—from its conception 
to its execution—the Executive Branch; this leads the Court to often treat 
the Executive Branch’s decisions on immigration policy as authoritative.120  
The Court, in making such findings, gives deference to the Executive 
Branch’s enforcement techniques121 and its actions in the furtherance of a 
well-founded objective.122 
                                                          
 113.  See supra Part I.A. 
 114.  338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).  
 115.  Id. 
 116.  342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
 117.  Id. at 588–89. 
 118.  426 U.S. 67 (1976).  
 119.  Id. at 81.  However, the Court continued, stating that because decisions of immigration 
policy may implicate foreign relations, and because of “changing political and economic circum-
stances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or 
the Executive than to the Judiciary.” Id.  Here the Court referred to the political branches in tan-
dem; however, the last sentence, due to its use of “or,” shows that the Executive Branch can act 
independently of Congress in deciding immigration policy.  See id. 
 120.  Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 110, at 461 (“Over time, the Court’s continued inattention 
to the scope of the President’s power over immigration policy has given rise to doctrinal confu-
sion.  In some cases, the Court has gone so far as to suggest that the President has inherent au-
thority to regulate entry into the country.”). 
 121.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 122.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
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1.  The Court Defers to Executive Branch Enforcement Techniques 
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,123 the Court, explained that “the 
final determination of [whether to deport an alien] may be entrusted by 
Congress to executive officers.”124  The decision reaffirmed the notion that 
it is within Congress’s purview to create immigration policy and delegate 
the execution of that policy to the Executive Branch.  The Court continued: 
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreign-
ers . . . shall be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitu-
tional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive 
branches of the national government.  As to such persons, the de-
cisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within pow-
ers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.125 
Although the Court maintains the notion that the Executive Branch 
acts in accordance with the powers expressly delegated by Congress, it also 
emphasizes that immigration officials have authority to exercise discretion 
regarding how immigration policy should be enforced.126  Nishimura Ekiu, 
therefore, indicates the Executive Branch did have authority to use its dis-
cretion to grant deferred action, and work authorization,127 pursuant to the 
2014 memo programs.128 
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,129 further illuminating the dichoto-
my between the political branches, the Court similarly indicated the Execu-
tive Branch’s power to use its discretion in the realm of immigration law 
enforcement.  When considering the legality of the order of deportation in 
question, the Court stated: “The power of Congress . . . to expel, like the 
power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country, 
may be exercised entirely through executive officers . . . .”130  In other 
words, the Executive Branch is not required to effectuate the immigration 
                                                          
 123.  142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
 124.  Id. at 660. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id.; see supra Part I.B.  Note that Section 287 of the INA does not require that immigra-
tion officers enforce immigration law, but rather merely states that they “shall have power” to en-
force it, therefore leaving open the option not to use said power.  INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 
287(a), 66 Stat. 163, 233–34 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2012)).  Under 
this interpretation, the Executive Branch, consequently, has the legal authority to direct immigra-
tion officers to defer the use of that power. 
 127.  United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134, 197 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting) (“The 
ability to apply for work authorization . . . has been tied to deferred action by a federal regulation 
since the early 1980s.  The most current such regulation . . . states that ‘[a]n alien who has been 
granted deferred action, an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives some 
cases lower priority,’ may apply for work authorization ‘if the alien establishes an economic ne-
cessity for employment.’” (alteration in original)). 
 128.  See supra Part I.C. 
 129.  149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 130.  Id. at 713–14 (emphasis added). 
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laws created by Congress, but rather retains power, independent from the 
Legislative Branch, over the implementation of immigration policy.131 
In fact, the Court further claimed in Fong Yue Ting, “[i]t is no new 
thing for the law-making power, acting either through treaties made by the 
President and Senate, or by . . . acts of Congress, to submit the decision of 
questions . . . to the final determination of executive officers.”132  In doing 
so, the Court once again invoked the common practice of legislative reli-
ance on and judicial deference to the Executive Branch and its officers in 
deciding the best ways to enforce immigration policy.  In actuality, Con-
gress cedes some of its “plenary power” to the Executive Branch to deter-
mine whether to shield certain undocumented individuals from deporta-
tion.133  The 2014 memo programs would have left such determinations to 
immigration officers: applicants for the programs would have submitted ev-
idence of their eligibility for the programs, then the officers would decide, 
using their discretion, whether the applicant qualified for deferred action.134 
Even when the Court decides to more directly intervene in the realm of 
immigration policy, it still tends to defer to the Executive Branch’s imple-
mentation of it.135  In the 1960s, for example, the Executive Branch con-
cluded that homosexuality fell under the statutory ground of inadmissibility 
based on “psychopathic personality.”  The Court faced a challenge to this 
interpretation in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,136 and 
concluded that the interpretation of the statute was reasonable.137  The Ex-
ecutive Branch did not have an explicit congressional mandate to make that 
                                                          
 131.  See supra Part I.B. 
 132.  Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 714. 
 133.  See supra Part I.C. 
 134.  Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 2015); contra Memoran-
dum from Jeh Johnson, supra note 70, at 4 (explicitly mandating that immigration officers use 
their discretion when reviewing applications for the 2014 memo programs, stating that applicants 
must “present no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of deferred ac-
tion inappropriate”); see also supra Part I.C. 
 135.  See, e.g., Shruti Rana, Chevron Without The Courts?: The Supreme Court’s Recent Chev-
ron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 313 (2012) (describ-
ing a common variety of administrative deference, Chevron deference, which is given to executive 
agencies when interpreting acts of Congress). 
 136.  387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
 137.  Id. at 119.  The INA of 1952 prohibited entry into the U.S. of “[a]liens afflicted with psy-
chopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect,” without explicitly mentioning homosexuality 
as fitting within this list; however, the INA was amended by Congress in 1965 to include “sexual 
deviation” as a ground for denying entry.  INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1952), am-
mended by INA, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (1965) (prior to 1990 amendment) 
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(iv) (2012)).  This provision was withdrawn from 
the INA two and a half decades later, upon the passing of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. 
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determination,138 but the Court seemingly decided to defer to the Executive 
Branch’s commitment to enforce immigration law in a way that benefits the 
interest of the public.139  In Zadvydas v. Davis,140 similarly, the Court rec-
ognized the “greater immigration-related expertise of the Executive 
Branch” and that “principles of judicial review in this area recognize prima-
ry Executive Branch responsibility.”141  Therefore, the Court noted, “re-
quire[s] courts to listen with care” to the determinations of the Executive 
Branch, including decisions to defer enforcement.142  Due to this precedent 
showing the Court’s past deference to the Executive Branch’s authority 
over the enforcement of immigration policy, the United States v. Texas 
courts should have similarly deferred to the Executive Branch’s implemen-
tation of the 2014 memo programs and denied the request for preliminary 
injunction.143 
2.  The Court Defers to the Executive Branch’s Well-Founded 
Objectives 
The Court has demonstrated that Congress’s Article I authority to en-
act immigration policy is often influenced by the Executive Branch’s well-
founded objectives to preserve national independence and foreign rela-
tions.144  In The Chinese Exclusion Case, for example, the Court explained 
that it was well settled that “the government of the United States, through 
the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territo-
ry.”145  The Court, however, expounded on that settled assertion by adding 
that Executive Branch’s “[j]urisdiction over its own [U.S.] territory . . . is a 
part of its independence.  If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that 
extent subject to the control of another power.”146  The Court, in this in-
stance, suggested that immigration policymaking is contingent on the Exec-
utive Branch’s compulsory objective to maintain the independence of the 
                                                          
 138.  Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 121–22 (showing the Court’s search of a report by “a subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary” for traces of legislative intent that would be support the 
Executive Branch’s determination”); see also supra note 137 and accompanying text.  
 139.  Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 119–23 (affirming the decision of the Special Inquiry Officer who 
found a homosexual man inadmissible due to his being a “person afflicted with psychopathic per-
sonality,” in spite of the absence of a legal mandate to do so). 
 140.  533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 141.  Id. at 700. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See supra Part I.D. 
 144.  See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (listing executive du-
ties with which immigration policy is interwoven such as “the conduct of foreign relations, the 
war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government”).  
 145.  130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889). 
 146.  Id. 
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United States in relation to foreign powers.147  This illustrates that, in the 
Court’s view, Congress’s immigration laws ought to be in accordance with 
the Executive Branch’s policy related to maintaining national independ-
ence.148  This view prioritizes the Executive Branch’s duty to preserve in-
dependence over Congress’s supposedly “plenary power” of Congress over 
immigration. 
The 2014 memo programs, pursuant to the Executive Branch’s policy 
objective to preserve national independence, sought to retain an invaluable 
workforce willing to work for low wages, which has the potential benefit of 
incentivizing U.S. businesses to remain in the United States and not out-
source to foreign countries.149  The programs would also likely reduce the 
federal deficit because would-be recipients of deferred action under the 
programs—who already pay a significant amount in federal taxes—would 
be able to participate in the economy without fearing ICE arrests; the in-
crease in economic activity would, therefore, likely facilitate the payment of 
even more taxes, strengthening U.S. financial security.150  The United States 
v. Texas courts should have recognized this crucial executive prerogative on 
which the 2014 memo programs were predicated and allowed the programs 
to go forward.151 
In The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court explored Congress’s consid-
eration of executive officials’ expertise to find a well-founded objective un-
derlying the Executive Branch’s actions.152  In determining the legality of 
the Chinese Exclusion Act, signed by President Arthur in 1882, the Court 
based its decision in part on a communication made by “Mr. Everett, then 
Secretary of State under President Fillmore, [who wrote]: ‘This government 
could never give up the right of excluding foreigners whose presence it 
might deem a source of danger to the United States.’”153  The Court, there-
fore, exercised deference by looking past the legislative intent behind the 
                                                          
 147.  See Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 911, 961 n.290 (2011) (discussing the Executive Branch’s power over U.S. law). 
 148.  The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609 (emphasizing the Executive Branch’s duty 
to preserve the national sovereignty of the United States). 
 149.  Press Release, The White House, Presidential Memorandum—Modernizing and Stream-
lining the U.S. Immigrant Visa System for the 21st Century (Nov. 24, 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/21/presidential-memorandum-modernizing-
and-streamlining-us-immigrant-visa-s [hereinafter Press Release, Modernizing and Streamlining]. 
 150.  LISA CHRISTENSEN GEE ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION AND ECON. POLICY, 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS’ STATE & LOCAL TAX CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (2016), 
http://www.itep.org/pdf/immigration2016.pdf (“Undocumented immigrants contribute significant-
ly to state and local taxes, collectively paying an estimated $11.64 billion a year.” (emphasis omit-
ted)).  
 151.  See supra Part I.C. 
 152.  130 U.S. at 607–10. 
 153.  Id. at 607 (quoting Communication from Edward Everett, Sec’y State to A. Dudley 
Mann, Special Agent, Dep’t of State in Eur. (Dec. 1852)). 
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creation of the Act to the Executive Branch’s goal of conducting sensible 
foreign affairs and preserving national security.154 
In the same vein, the 2014 memo programs were premised on the Ex-
ecutive Branch’s well-founded objective of including foreigners whose ab-
sence it seemingly deemed “a source of danger to the United States,” for the 
expulsion of such people detrimentally impacts the U.S. economy, federal 
deficit,155 and U.S. citizens whose families are undocumented.156  In light of 
the Court’s deference to agents of the Executive Branch in The Chinese Ex-
clusion Case,157 the courts should have given substantially more deference 
to the U.S. government in United States v. Texas and decided not to enjoin 
the 2014 memo programs.158 
In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Court described the 
Executive Branch as having the inherent objective of excluding certain al-
iens in the interest of foreign affairs and the best interests of the United 
States.159  The Court explained that “[w]hen Congress prescribes a proce-
dure concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a 
legislative power.  It is implementing an inherent executive power.”160  In 
effect, this assertion by the Court implies that Congress’s ability to form 
immigration policy is reliant on the Executive Branch’s inherent power to 
ensure that that the U.S. immigration system works in the national interest.  
The Court, moreover, clarified that in “the instant case[,] the Attorney Gen-
eral, exercising the discretion entrusted to him by Congress and the Presi-
dent, concluded upon the basis of confidential information that the public 
interest required that petitioner be denied the privilege of entry into the 
United States.”161 
The 2014 memo programs aligned with the executive objective of fur-
thering the public interest, for the goal of the programs was partly to keep in 
the country a low-wage workforce162 on which many U.S. citizens de-
                                                          
 154.  The Court considered statements Congress relied on when creating the Act made, inter 
alios, by Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State under President Pierce; Mr. Fish, Secretary of State under 
President Grant; Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State under President Hayes; and Mr. Frelinghuysen, 
Secretary of State under President Arthur.  Id. at 607–10. 
 155.  Id. at 607. 
 156.  See infra Part II.C. 
 157.  The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603–04. 
 158.  See supra Part I.D. 
 159.  338 U.S. 537, 539, 542 (1950) (stating the question presented as whether “the United 
States [may] exclude without hearing, solely upon a finding by the Attorney General that her ad-
mission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States, the alien wife of a citizen who 
had served honorably in the armed forces of the United States during World War II?”). 
 160.  Id. at 542 (emphasis added).  
 161.  Id. at 544. 
 162.  Press Release, Modernizing and Streamlining, supra note 149 (“Such action would not 
only continue our proud tradition of welcoming immigrants to this country, but also reduce Feder-
al deficits, increase productivity, and raise wages for all Americans.  Immigration reform is an 
economic, national security, and moral imperative.”). 
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pend.163  The programs also aimed to strengthen the financial stability of the 
U.S. government through the abundance of tax revenue that comes from 
undocumented immigrants.164  Finally, unity between U.S. citizens and res-
idents and their undocumented family members was an additional compel-
ling objective in the public interest that the 2014 memo programs sought to 
pursue.165  In light of the holding in Shaughnessy, therefore, the United 
States v. Texas courts should have upheld the 2014 memo programs be-
cause they grant immigration officials the authority to act in the public in-
terest. 
3.  The 2014 Memo Programs’ Well-Founded Objective to Allow 
the Immigrant Community to Exit from the Shadows 
As briefly delineated above, the Executive Branch has articulated, in 
the face of fervent opposition,166 a pressing need to grant deferred action to 
undocumented immigrants who do not pose a risk to the United States.167  
This Section illustrates in more detail the well-founded objective referred to 
above, showing that the Executive Branch’s objective was well-researched 
and grounded in compelling reasoning, including humanitarian, economic, 
and national security grounds,168 therefore deserving deference by the 
courts.169 
In 2014, the White House released a memorandum in which it ex-
plained, “despite the overwhelming contributions of immigrants to our Na-
tion’s prosperity, our immigration system is broken and has not kept pace 
with changing times.”170  Regarding these “overwhelming contributions” to 
the United States by immigrants, the memorandum continued, 
“[i]mmigrants represent the majority of our PhDs in math, computer sci-
                                                          
 163.  Jacoby, supra note 1. 
 164.  GEE ET AL., supra note 150, at 1.  
 165.  See infra Part II.C. 
 166.  See Immigration Action Gets Mixed Response, but Legal Pathway Still Popular, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/11/immigration-action-gets-
mixed-response-but-legal-pathway-still-popular/ (“About as many disapprove (50%) as approve 
(46%) of Obama’s action, which could make up to 4 million people . . . newly eligible for deporta-
tion relief.  Roughly eight-in-ten Republicans (82%) disapprove of the executive action and about 
seven-in-ten Democrats (71%) approve of it, with very strong attitudes on both sides.”); supra 
Part I.D. (Texas, along with twenty-five other states, filed for a preliminary injunction against the 
enactment of the DAPA memorandum in the Southern District of Texas). 
 167.  See supra Parts I.C., II.A.2. 
 168.  Press Release, Modernizing and Streamlining, supra note 149 (“Such action would not 
only continue our proud tradition of welcoming immigrants to this country, but also reduce Feder-
al deficits, increase productivity, and raise wages for all Americans.  Immigration reform is an 
economic, national security, and moral imperative.”). 
 169.  See supra Part I.D. 
 170.  Press Release, Modernizing and Streamlining, supra note 149. 
 2017] UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 1213 
ence, and engineering. . . . Immigrants are also more than twice as likely as 
native-born Americans to start a business in the United States.”171 
In forming the well-founded objective underlying the 2014 memo pro-
grams, the Executive Branch vested time and resources into intimately un-
derstanding the varying interests, motives, and ideologies of people on both 
sides of the immigration reform debate by meeting with an array of experts 
and interested parties.172  For example, in April of 2011, the President met 
with “a broad group of business, law enforcement, faith, and former and 
current elected leaders from across the political spectrum” to engage in a 
discussion on how the immigration system can be changed “to meet our 
21st century economic and security needs.”173 
In 2011, similarly, President Obama met with the Congressional His-
panic Caucus where he detailed “how the Administration continues to im-
prove our legal immigration system, secure our borders, and enhance our 
immigration enforcement.”174  The President also noted that his Administra-
tion’s aim was to improve enforcement practices by focusing on criminal, 
undocumented immigrants to avoid wasting resources prosecuting immi-
grants able to stay in the country, leaving those resources available for legit-
imate national security objectives.175 
The impetus behind the President’s initiative to implement the 2014 
memo programs is likely connected to the continued increase in immigra-
tion to the United States, as well as an increase in the audibility of the im-
migrant community and its advocates.176 
                                                          
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Press Release, The White House, Readout of the President’s Meeting with Stakeholders 
on Fixing the Broken Immigration System (Apr. 19, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/04/19/readout-presidents-meeting-stakeholders-fixing-broken-immigration-
system. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Press Release, The White House, Readout of the President’s Meeting with the Congres-
sional Hispanic Caucus on Fixing the Broken Immigration System (May 3, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/03/readout-presidents-meeting-
congressional-hispanic-caucus-fixing-broken-i.  
 175.  Id. (“[The President] noted that his Administration will continue to work toward improv-
ing our enforcement practices so that we are not using our limited resources on those potentially 
eligible for an adjustment of status, but rather tightening our efforts so that the Department of 
Homeland Security . . . focused on [detaining] criminals . . . .”). 
 176.  The immigrant community in the United States is undoubtedly large—and continues to 
increase.  In 1850, there were roughly 2.2 million immigrants in the United States; in 1890, the 
immigrant community rose to about 14.8 percent of the U.S population; by 2014, there were 42.4 
million immigrants residing in the United States, making up 13.3 percent of our nation’s popula-
tion.  Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigra-
tion in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 14, 2016), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-
immigration-united-states#CurrentandHistoricalNumbersandShares.  As the Executive Branch 
transitions from one administration to another, the programs of the prior may be nixed, but this 
pressing impetus for comprehensive immigration reform will continue. 
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While in the past it was difficult to gauge the exact number of immi-
grants in any given community, immigrants and advocates have found crea-
tive ways to bring their lives and human rights closer to the forefront of the 
immigration debate.  Social and news media, for example, are used as a 
medium through which immigrants make their presence and value known, 
evidenced, for example, by a “virtual iMarch” on Washington in May 
2013.177  This event not only “show[ed] the muscle behind pro-immigration 
forces,” but also “represented the culmination of years of savvy and relent-
less efforts by Latino activists to mobilize supporters through social media, 
and draw undocumented immigrants out of the shadows to maximize politi-
cal leverage.”178 
Further, undocumented immigrants, in the face of a turbulent view of 
people like themselves, have taken a leap of faith by allowing their stories 
to be published in some of the most prominent news outlets, putting a hu-
man face and story to the group often referred to as only “undocumented 
immigrants,” or perhaps  more pejorative terms.179  For example, José An-
tonio Vargas, who immigrated from the Philippines and is now working in 
the United States as a successful journalist, shared his experience as an im-
migrant.180  Mr. Vargas, in the New York Times Magazine, used his fearless 
voice to show otherwise unaware Americans the reality of being an undoc-
umented immigrant, writing that immigrants are “not always who you think 
we are.  Some pick your strawberries or care for your children.  Some are in 
high school or college.  And some, it turns out, write news articles you 
might read.”181  Mr. Vargas continued by elucidating an often cruel impact 
immigration law enforcement can have on a person, explaining, “I grew up 
here.  This is my home.  Yet even though I think of myself as an American 
and consider America my country, my country doesn’t think of me as one 
of its own.”182  Similarly, Tony Choi, a social media manager for an organi-
zation named Soze, shared his story of coming to the United States nearly 
                                                          
 177.  Lois Romano, Latinos Push Reform on Social Media, POLITICO (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/latinos-reform-social-media-091901.  
 178.  Id.  Similarly, Welcome.us, a nonprofit organization that dedicates itself to celebrating a 
diverse America, formed an online campaign wherein stories of immigrant celebrities and com-
mon folk are shared to encourage the United States to stand in solidarity with arriving immigrants.  
See generally Our Stories Make up the American Story, IMMIGRANT HERITAGE MONTH, 
http://welcome.us/stories/ (detailing stories of an array of immigrants in the United States) (last 
visited May 17, 2017). 
 179.  See Gambino, supra note 2 (using the term “undocumented immigrants” and impugning 
the use of terms like “illegal”). 
 180.  José A. Vargas, My Life as an Undocumented Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 22, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/magazine/my-life-as-an-undocumented-immigrant.ht 
ml?_r=0; José A. Vargas, Not Legal Not Leaving, TIME (June 25, 2012), http://content.time.com/ 
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 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
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two decades ago from South Korea due to economic turmoil.183  Mr. Choi is 
an undocumented immigrant who received deferred action under DACA 
2012.184  He said that living with the constant fear that his status could be 
revoked, and that he could be removed to a country of which he only has 
vague memories.185 
The Executive Branch’s well-founded objective of effectuating the 
2014 memo programs to give certain undocumented individuals permission 
to remain in the United States was likely fueled by the publication of the 
stories of people like Mr. Vargas and Mr. Choi.186  For example, President 
Obama issued statements in which he expressed the U.S. interest in: retain-
ing immigrants who are well-educated187 (like Mr. Vargas and Mr. Choi), 
keeping hard workers (like Mr. Vargas and Mr. Choi) who may be willing 
to take an unpopular, tough job, and perhaps most crucially, keeping fami-
lies together.188  The Executive Branch potentially found these well-
founded objectives to outweigh any foreseeable economic harm on the 
plaintiff states. 
B.  United States v. Texas Missed the Mark: Familial and Financial 
Injuries to Residents of Plaintiff States Outweigh the (Self-Inflicted) 
Alleged Economic Injury to the States Themselves 
1.  The States’ Alleged Injury 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Texas, as previously 
noted, hinged to a large degree on the economic injury and administrative 
inconvenience that the plaintiff states would suffer if the 2014 memo pro-
grams were to go into effect.189  Texas, nevertheless, did not sufficiently 
prove its alleged injury was fairly traceable to the 2014 memo programs.  
Texas’s contention “that documentation confirming lawful presence pursu-
                                                          
 183.  Saleah Blancaflor, ‘I Am an Immigrant’: Campaign Brings Faces, Voices to Immigrant 
Heritage Month, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/i-am-
immigrant-video-campaign-brings-faces-voices-immigrant-heritage-n581661. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  See Press Release, Modernizing and Streamlining, supra note 149.  
 187.  Barack Obama, President of the United States, National Address on Immigration (Nov. 
20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-
nation-immigration (asking, “Are we a nation that educates the world’s best and brightest in our 
universities, only to send them home to create businesses in countries that compete against us?  Or 
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America?”). 
 188.  Id. (“They work hard, often in tough, low-paying jobs.  They support their families. . . . 
Many of their kids are American-born or spent most of their lives here, and their hopes, dreams, 
and patriotism are just like ours.  As my predecessor, President Bush, once put it: ‘They are a part 
of American life.’”). 
 189.  See supra Part I.C. 
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ant to DAPA would allow otherwise ineligible aliens to become eligible for 
state-subsidized driver’s licenses” is not supported by its transportation 
code.190  Texas, therefore, would only have to change its license-
subsidization policy, which can be changed without legislative action as it 
is not grounded in any statutory authority, in order to avoid issuing licenses 
to recipients of the 2014 memo programs.191  Texas’s alleged injury, in oth-
er words, was purely “self-inflicted.”192 
Moreover, the alleged “injury” the programs posed was not actual or 
imminent but, in fact, already existed and was implicitly condoned by Tex-
as.  Individuals who have status through DACA,193 the Violence Against 
Women Act, and the U Visa program,194 for example, are eligible, under 
Texas transportation code, to obtain driver’s licenses.  The code provides 
that people who are “authorized [to] stay in the United States, as indicated 
by the documentation presented under Section 521.142(a),” including any 
“documentation issued by the appropriate United States agency that author-
izes the applicant to be in the United States before the applicant may be is-
sued a driver’s license.”195  If Texas genuinely took issue with granting 
driver’s licenses to these classes of immigrants, it would have already 
changed its license-subsidization policy to preclude individuals under other 
visa programs from getting licenses. 
Texas could contend that the sheer number of recipients of deferred ac-
tion under the 2014 memo programs, compared to the lesser number of the 
aforementioned recipients, was the factor causing the injury.  This injury, 
however, was caused by Texas’s own policy regarding the issuance of state 
driver’s licenses, not because the Department of Homeland Security decid-
ed to use its power of prosecutorial discretion.196  Interestingly, Texas 
broadcasts its driver’s license policy, openly marketing itself as a state in 
which recipients of deferred action can get a driver’s license,197 therefore 
                                                          
 190.  Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 149 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 191.  TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.1425(d) (West 2010) (“The department may not deny a 
driver’s license to an applicant who provides documentation described by Section 521.142(a) 
based on the duration of the person’s authorized stay in the United States, as indicated by the doc-
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States maintains that Texas’s injury is self-inflicted because the state voluntarily chose to base its 
driver’s license policies on federal immigration law.” (citation omitted) (citing 426 U.S. 660 
(1976) (per curiam)). 
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states challenged the expansion of DACA through the 2014 memorandum. 
 194.  See generally Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115 (2015) 
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 195.  TRANSP. §§ 521.142, .1425(d). 
 196.  See supra Part I.A. 
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bolstering the argument that its economic injury is “self-inflicted.”198  The 
number of the aforementioned recipients within Texas, therefore, could 
amount to a large portion of Texas’s immigrants.199 
The plaintiffs, furthermore, did not adequately argue that the 2014 
memo constituted final agency action, requiring notice-and-comment rule-
making pursuant to the APA.200  The 2014 memo, in fact, was mere agency 
guidance because it explicitly required immigration officers use discretion 
in adjudicating applications for the 2014 memo programs, which lacks fi-
nality in that it does not impose a hard-and-fast rule to which immigration 
officers must adhere.201  As the 2014 memo was just guidance, the court 
should have applied Chevron deference,202 the requirements of which the 
2014 memo would have satisfied for it was, at the very least, “minim[ally]” 
reasonable and was “not patently inconsistent with the [INA’s] statutory 
scheme.”203 
The court found that the United State’s argument that the injunction 
“obstruct[ed] a core Executive prerogative and offend[ed] separation-of-
powers and federalism principles” implicated vague and less substantial in-
terests in comparison with the states’ alleged harms.204  Despite this finding 
by the court, the injuries alleged by the plaintiff states are dwarfed by the 
drastic injuries the preliminary injunction likely has on people residing in 
the United States, including familial and financial harms.205 
2.  Familial and Financial Injuries to Residents of Plaintiff States 
The well-being of people residing in the United States is profoundly 
harmed by the injunction on the 2014 memo programs.  In fact, in 2015, the 
Center for American Progress released a detailed report specifying the eco-
nomic benefits—to residents of many of the plaintiff states—that the 2014 
                                                          
Texas’s will to give “[p]erson[s] granted deferred action” driver’s licenses if they present certain 
documentation of their grant of deferred action.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 198.  Texas, 809 F.3d at 157 (“Relying primarily on Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, the United 
States maintains that Texas’s injury is self-inflicted because the state voluntarily chose to base its 
driver’s license policies on federal immigration law.” (citation omitted) (citing 426 U.S. 660 
(1976) (per curiam)). 
 199.  But see Krogstad et al., supra note 4 (illustrating the truism that unauthorized immigra-
tion statistics are mere estimates). 
 200.  See supra Part I.D. 
 201.  Texas, 809 F.3d at 174. 
 202.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (finding that 
courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes unless said interpretations are unreasona-
ble). 
 203.  Texas, 809 F.3d at 218 (first quoting Tex. Office of the Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 
F.3d 393, 420 (5th Cir. 1999); and then quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F3d 
788, 813 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
 204.  Id. at 186. 
 205.  See supra Part II.A.3. 
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memo programs would produce.206  The report showed that these programs 
would have enabled 5.2 million individuals to legally work and, therefore, 
be “economically productive.”207  In other words, the 2014 memo programs 
would have likely bolstered the economies of the states in which would-be 
applicants for the programs reside, benefitting U.S. citizens living in those 
states.208  This, more specifically, would have resulted in greater tax reve-
nue and economic activity, among other benefits to the states and their resi-
dents.209 
Family unity, but for the injunction, would have been preserved, which 
is of great importance as it is one of the guiding principles of immigration 
law (as seen, for example, by the INA’s structure, centering to a large de-
gree around familial relationships).210  The 2014 memo programs, moreo-
ver, could have shielded countless undocumented immigrants from separa-
tion from their immediate relatives; DAPA alone would have likely allowed 
nearly 3.6 million undocumented parents to remain in the country with their 
children.211  These potential DAPA recipients have deep roots in the United 
States, with twenty-five percent having lived in the United States for at least 
twenty years and sixty-nine percent for ten years or more.212  The court, fur-
thermore, ignored its precedential mandate to “listen with care”213 to the 
expertise of the Executive Branch regarding the importance of family unity 
in the realm of immigration law, which has been a tradition over several 
presidential administrations.214  The courts’ failure to consider family unity 
as a crucial component of the 2014 memo programs resulted in a disregard 
for the Supreme Court’s contemporary perspective on the importance of 
family.215 
The Court’s view on family has changed in recent years, shifting in a 
direction that gives rise to the argument that lawful permanent residents and 
their immigrant family members should both receive greater constitutional 
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protection.216  For example, although the Court has long held that marriage 
is a fundamental right,217 in Obergefell v. Hodges,218 the Court painted a 
more accurate, ample, and humane vision of family and its crucial role 
within U.S. society.  In that case, the Court rested its decision that same-sex 
couples had a constitutional right to marriage on several grounds to protect 
every U.S. citizen’s right to marriage.219  Many of these grounds apply to 
the U.S. interest in maintaining family unity when one relative is a U.S. cit-
izen or lawful permanent resident.220  The Obergefell Court, for example, 
noted that families of same-sex couples are “relegated to a more difficult 
and uncertain family life”221 due to bans on same-sex marriage; this paral-
lels the way in which U.S. citizen children of undocumented parents must 
endure the constant uncertainty of whether their parents will be able to stay 
with them in the United States.222  Additionally, the Court, quoting Alexis 
de Tocqueville, explained, “[w]hen the American retires from the turmoil of 
public life to the bosom of his family, he finds in it the image of order and 
of peace. . . . [H]e afterwards carries [that image] with him into public af-
fairs.”223  When family of deportees retire from the turmoil of public life to 
a void in their home, they may find the image of disarray and distress; that 
image can likewise follow them into public affairs. 
The Texas court, therefore, should have focused its analysis on the 
large-scale societal benefits that could have emerged from the 2014 memo 
programs—and the equally large harms that could befall the United States if 
would-be applicants for the 2014 memo programs are deported—instead of 
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dwelling on the relatively less significant and, in Texas’s case, self-inflicted 
financial cost and administrative inconvenience to the plaintiffs.224 
III.  CONCLUSION 
United States v. Texas presented the courts with a complex question 
intertwined with immigration and administrative law,225 as well as jurispru-
dence replete with confusing conflations of the political branch’s respective 
powers over the immigration system.226  Upon review, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction, holding that Texas 
had Article III standing due to the cost of issuing driver’s licenses to to re-
cipients of deferred action under the 2014 memo programs, and that the en-
forcement of the 2014 memos violated the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements of the APA.  The courts, however, misunderstood the power 
of the Executive Branch to unilaterally make immigration policy in order to 
benefit individuals directly impacted by that policy as well as U.S. citi-
zens.227  Engaging in a flawed analysis, the courts additionally focused on 
issues of the case that were plainly peripheral to compelling concerns that 
the Executive Branch sought to assuage.228  In enjoining the 2014 memo 
programs, the courts did not appropriately defer to the Executive Branch’s 
wisdom and authority in determining who can stay and lawfully work in the 
United States.229  This does not mean, however, that the Executive Branch 
possesses unchecked authority to unilaterally affect immigration policy; the 
Executive Branch must only be permitted by the courts to do so when it has 
demonstrated impartiality230 and a thorough comprehension of the U.S. 
economy and American values.231  As is likely, when similar cases involv-
ing the scope of the Executive Branch’s power over immigration policy 
arise in the future, the courts ought to recognize the historical deference 
granted to the political branches without losing sight of the enduring need 
for questions of immigration law to be decided on the basis of unbiased be-
liefs and in accordance with law.  The courts, most importantly, must en-
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sure that the Executive Branch “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,” in a manner faithful to facts and the interest of U.S. citizens.232 
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